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If we care for the poor and we care for the environment, what are we to 
do? Is the proper path to follow to turn to the state, passing laws that 
mandate that others share in our concerns? Several of the speakers at the 
"Peace with Creation" symposium at the University of St. Thomas School 
of Law (where the talk on which this article is based was first delivered) 
must believe so, as I have heard calls for international treaties to address 
climate change, publicly provided medical care, subsidies for small scale 
agriculture, and a host of other government programs to redress the 
problems of the poor and the environment. 1 My fellow participants who call 
for state action, and many in the wider debate as well, do so with the best of 
motives and using powerful language from the rich heritage of Christian 
social thought generally and from Catholic social teaching specifically. 
Their calls for expanding the scope of the state are mistaken, however, for 
they fail to consider the truths about human behavior that economists have 
discovered. I do not propose to substitute The Wealth of Nations for the 
Gospels; rather I propose to understand our Gospel-derived obligations in 
light of the insights of Adam Smith. If we fail to do so, we risk substituting 
symbolism for effective action and feeling good for doing good. If our 
obligation toward God's creation is to be good stewards and our obligation 
toward the poor is to do charity, then our good intentions will not suffice 
when called to account for our ineffectual or counter-productive actions 
when more effective courses of action were open to us. 
Thomas Woods, Jr., an author whose work I greatly admire, opens his 
remarkable book The Church and the Market: A Catholic Defense of the 
Free Economy with a chapter entitled "In Defense of Economics."2 It is 
unfortunate that virtually every claim of relevance for economics within a 
discourse among Christians is compelled to begin with such a defense. 
Instead of a defense, I am going to begin with the assertion that economics 
is not only relevant to our discussion of the preferential option for the poor 
and the environment, but it also is essential to that discussion. In short, I 
will make the somewhat radical claim that unless we understand economics 
1. See John Hart, The Poor of the Planet and the Planet of the Poor: Ecological Ethics and 
Economic Liberation,S U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 144 (2008); Lucia A. Silecchia, The "Preferential 
Option for the Poor": An Opportunity and a Challenge for Environmental Decision Making,S U. 
ST. THOMAS LJ. 87 (2008). 
2. THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., THE CHURCH AND THE MARKET: A CATHOLIC DEFENSE OF THE 
FREE ECONOMY 13-39 (2005). 
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and apply economic reasoning to environmental problems, not only will we 
fail to solve those environmental problems, but we will also fail to satisfy 
our Christian obligation to provide a preferential option for the poor. 
I do not think this actually is a radical claim, but it sounds radical 
because the environmental policy debate usually proceeds on terms that cast 
markets as environmental villains. The tenor of the debate has changed a 
little as of late, in part due to the impact of economists like Wheaton 
College economist P.J. Hill, my colleague at the Property and Environment 
Research Center (PERC) and a particularly thoughtful thinker about the 
intersection of Christianity, economics, and the environment.3 This change 
is also due to the work of Rev. Robert Sirico and his colleagues at the 
Acton Institute.4 It has not changed enough, however, to make the 
environmental policy debate sufficiently realistic such that environmental 
law has a chance of positively affecting the lives of the poor and improving 
our stewardship of God's creation, as our discussion at the symposium 
suggested. Beginning with some basic economic truths, which I will then 
apply to environmental problems and to the problems of the poor, I will 
conclude by defending my claim that economics is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to addressing environmental policy while also giving due 
attention to the needs of the poor. 
SOME ECONOMIC TRUTHS 
Economics offers many insights into how the world around us works, 
much more than would be possible to summarize even in a full-length law 
review article with many footnotes.s From among those many insights, I 
have selected three "propositions" that demonstrate the fundamental points 
that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to address environmental 
issues and that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to reconcile the 
obligations of faith toward the poor and the need to protect the 
environment. 
By "propositions" I mean fundamental truths about human behavior 
and the natural world that we ignore at our peril, truths as basic as the laws 
of gravity or humanity's susceptibility to sin. We can write statutes or regu-
lations that ignore these-and Congress, legislatures, and regulators the 
world over frequently do-but such measures risk the same fatal results as 
bridges built without accounting for gravity. These propositions I will offer 
are economic "theory," but they are theory in the sense that the laws of 
3. See, e.g., Peter J. Hill, Environmental Theology: A Judea-Christian Defense, 3 MARKETS 
& MORALITY 158 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Rev. Robert A. Sirico, Our Stewardship Mandate, RELIGION & LIBERTY, 
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 15. 
5. Even St. John the Theologian noted in his Gospel that "[a]nd there are also many other 
things which Jesus did, which if they were written in detail, I suppose that even the world itself 
would not contain the books that would be written." John 21:25. 
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gravity are a theory and are founded upon economic insights spanning hun-
dreds of years of careful analyses, testing of hypotheses, and rigorous de-
bates. That does not mean all economists agree on all policy implications or 
that every prediction by an economist comes true. It does mean that the core 
principles of the discipline are not mere matters of opinion and that eco-
nomics is not a "point of view" to be accorded equal weight with folk tales 
or political preferences. All theories of how the world works are not equal 
-some work better than others and the ones that work deserve greater 
weight in policy debates than the ones that do not. Economics' great 
strength is that it is a concise and powerful theory that explains the world 
remarkably well. Those who ignore its insights are doomed to fail. 
Proposition 1: TANSTAAFL 
Science fiction author Robert Heinlein coined the phrase "TAN-
STAAFL" as a shorthand way of saying "There Ain't No Such Thing As A 
Free Lunch" in his classic 1966 science fiction novel The Moon is a Harsh 
Mistress, in which he described a revolution by residents of lunar colonies 
against oppressive governments on Earth in 2076.6 Heinlein had the revo-
lutionaries emblazon T ANST AAFL on their flag and wove the principle 
through the free lunar society he imagined-a place where even air cost 
people money. 
"No free lunch" means that everything costs something. Everything. 
No exceptions. At a minimum, if I spend my time doing one activity, I 
cannot spend that time doing something else. Economists refer to the idea 
that resources devoted to one activity are unavailable for other activities as 
"opportunity cost." If we do X, we cannot use those resources to do Y. The 
failure to recognize that there is an opportunity cost to committing re-
sources to any given use can have disastrous consequences because when 
we do not recognize that our actions have costs we cannot intelligently con-
sider our alternatives. And if we cannot assess the costs and benefits of our 
alternatives, we cannot make reasoned choices among them.7 In short, 
tradeoffs matter, and we need to pay attention to them. 
We live in a post-Fall, resource constrained society. In the language of 
Economics 101, we face a choice between guns and butter. If we buy more 
guns, we have fewer resources left for butter. The same principle applies 
whether we are considering individual choices or social choices about the 
6. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON Is A HARSH MISTRESS 162 (Orb Books 1997) (1966). 
For an examination of the underlying legal implications of the novel, see Dmitry N. Feofanov, 
Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, 63 TENN. L. REv. 
71 (1995). 
7. Bjorn Lomborg makes this argument in his book on global warming: "Far from being 
amoral to compare costs and benefits, it is crucially moral to ask, How do we help the most? Can 
it really be moral to do anything less?" BJORN LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRON-
MENTALIST'S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 135 (2007). 
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allocation of tax dollars. Because we live in a world of scarce resources, we 
must choose between competing uses of our resources. Just as individuals 
do, so too must regulators make such choices. 
There are many environmental examples of TANSTAAFL in action; I 
will briefly mention one concerning private choices and one concerning 
public choices. The private choice example involves the Nature Conser-
vancy, an environmental group which engages in efforts to protect the envi-
ronment by acquiring environmentally sensitive land.8 The group contracts 
for oil and gas production and logging on some properties, generating in-
come that can be used for additional preservation efforts elsewhere.9 These 
transactions occur because the group recognizes the opportunity cost of not 
developing the land-in short, TANSTAAFL. The Nature Conservancy 
must either engage in some economic use of its land that can generate such· 
revenues or forego the opportunity for revenues that would enable it to fur-
ther its mission. In some cases, limited development provides the organiza-
tion with the resources to have a greater impact by allowing it to acquire 
more land elsewhere. 
The public choice example is the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Io The state agency 
issued regulations that prohibited property owner David Lucas from build-
ing on two beach front properties he owned. Lucas sued, arguing that the 
regulations had taken his property under the Takings Clause because they 
effectively foreclosed all development. The Supreme Court agreed, and the 
Commission was forced to purchase the property from Lucas. Because of 
opportunity costs, paying for the property meant that the Commission had 
fewer resources available for its other activities. Ironically, once it bore the 
opportunity cost, the Commission determined that the additional environ-
mental benefit of preventing construction on Lucas' property was not worth 
the cost and sold the land to a builder, who constructed homes on the prop-
ertyY Faced with the opportunity cost of its behavior, the agency was 
forced to make decisions about its priorities. 
8. The Nature Conservancy is controversial because of issues surrounding both its spending 
and its fundraising. See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Image is a Sensitive Issue, WASH. 
POST, May 4, 2003, at A23, for a discussion of an internal memo from the group in response to the 
Washington Post series that showed that the organization was "worried that the charity would be 
portrayed as if it had 'systematically colluded with wealthy individuals and corporations to con-
duct land transactions that manipulate the tax code to the benefit of the affluent' and that it would 
appear to be an 'environmental Enron.' " 
9. Monte Burke, Bco-Pragmatists, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.forbes. 
comllforbes/2001/0903/063.html. 
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
11. For the development history of the plot as graphically illustrated by economics professor 
William Fischel in his web essays, see William Fischel, A Photographic Update on Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-wfis-
chel/lucasupdate.html; and William Fischel, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A Photo-
graphic Essay, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-wfischelllucasessay.html; see also DAVID 
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Proposition 2: Incentives matter 
In general, when something is more expensive, people buy less of it 
and when it is less expensive, they buy more of it. 12 Thus incentives matter: 
when costs go up or down, people make different choices. In other words, 
demand curves slope down, and supply curves slope up. I wish that stating a 
simple truth like this as a "proposition" was seen as silly because of the 
now-universal acceptance of its self-evidence, but environmental laws in 
particular seem to have been written not only in ignorance of the truth and 
importance of supply and demand, as if economic incentives did not matter 
at all. 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is perhaps the best known exam-
ple of a law that ignores the importance of incentives. 13 The case of the red-
cockaded woodpecker is an excellent example of why taking incentive ef-
fects of regulatory efforts into account is critical to accomplishing statutory 
goals. 14 Economists Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael examined private tim-
ber land owners' management decisions in an area of North Carolina where 
the woodpeckers lived. 15 Their results exemplify the impact of incentives. 
When red-cockaded woodpecker nests were found on private land, ESA 
regulations required a series of steps to protect the nests which cost the 
LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995) (Lucas' own account); Dana Beach & Kim Diana 
Connolly, A Retrospective on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Public Policy Implica-
tionsfor the 21st CentUlY, 12 SE. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 14 (2003) (describing post-decision purchase and 
sale). Cf, Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More 
Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORlES 221 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 
2004) (a more skeptical account of the Lucas property's history). 
12. In two special cases, an increase in price induces an increase in demand. The first con-
cerns a class of lUXUry goods, sometimes termed "Veblen goods" after economist Thorstein Veb-
len. Higher prices make these goods more desirable, because possessing them signals the owner's 
wealth and status. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 85 (1899); Laurie 
Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consump-
tion, 86 AM. EeoN. REv. 349, 350 (1996). The other class of such goods is "Giffen goods," in 
which the interaction of substitution and income effects produces an increase in demand. The only 
empirical evidence of the existence of such goods is in the context of poor consumers attempting 
to maintain subsistence consumption levels when prices rise. See Robert T. Jensen & Nolan H. 
Miller, Giffen Behavior: Theory and Evidence (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 13243, 2007). The classic example of this is low quality foods. When the price of poor quality 
bread increases, low income buyers must spend more of their income maintaining their consump-
tion level of the poor quality bread. Id. As a result, they have less money left over to buy better 
quality bread, and so increase their consumption of the low quality bread to replace the better 
quality bread they can no longer afford. See Michael V. White, Invention in the Face of Necessity: 
Marshallian Rhetoric and the Giffen Good(s), ECON. REc., Mar. 1990, at 1. Neither is relevant to 
the discussion of environmental goods and services. 
13. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The 'Living Constitu-
tion,' the Third Amendment and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769 (2000). 
14. One reason it is repeatedly discussed is that there is a shocking lack of social science 
research into the incentive effects of the ESA. See Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The 
Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REv. 
301 (forthcoming 2008). 
15. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endan-
gered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003). 
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landowners considerable timber revenue-a single colony could cost a 
landowner up to $200,000 in potential revenue. 16 Because red-cockaded 
woodpeckers prefer to build nests in older pine trees, harvesting timber 
before the trees reach the age at which the birds nest in them greatly reduces 
the chances of a nest being built. And, of course, harvesting timber of any 
age before a colony's presence is documented, and the regulations applied, 
eliminates the potential losses from regulatory enforcement. What Lueck 
and Michael found was that proximity to an existing red-cockaded wood-
pecker colony led to a higher probability of both timber harvesting in gen-
eral and of the harvesting of younger trees in particular. In short, because 
the ESA-regulations made the presence of red-cockaded woodpeckers 
costly to them, landowners took steps to reduce the likelihood that the 
woodpeckers would establish a presence on their land. Note that all the 
steps the landowners took to prevent woodpecker colonization were entirely 
legal, but the ESA incentives had created an incentive to "shoot, shovel, and 
shut Up."17 
This result is remarkable only in the context of discussions of whether 
environmental laws create bad incentives. Environmental pressure groups 
routinely make incentive-based arguments when arguing for the need for 
additional laws. For example, they often argue that without penalties and 
permit regulations, firms will dispose of wastes through smokestacks and 
pipelines, polluting the air and water. Only when the same logic is applied 
to the impact of environmental statutes, particularly ones as symbolically 
important as the Endangered Species Act, is the application of economic 
logic labeled as illegitimate. But to deny that incentives matter is as foolish 
and counterproductive as to deny that gravity causes objects to fall when 
they are dropped. . . 
Proposition 3: The margin matters 
Regrettably, political discourse often casts decisions in terms of abso-
lutes, with all the nuance and insight of a bumper-sticker: "Extinction is 
forever;" "save the whales;" or "protect our natural resources." But most 
choices are not made between absolutes or extremes; most are made at the 
margins. We are only rarely confronted with either/or choices. Most of the 
time we must decide between allocating a little more of our (or someone 
else's) time, money, or other resources to this activity or that. Should we 
increase the habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker by adding this parcel 
to the protected area or not? Should we reduce ambient air levels of ozone 
from 0.09 parts per million (ppm) to 0.08 ppm? And at the margin, incen-
tives are particularly important. 
16. Id. at 33. 
17. Robert H. Nelson, Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 82. 
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The discovery that margins matter was no small thing. Historians of 
economic thought term the beginning of systematic consideration of margi-
nal analysis in the late nineteenth century the "marginal revolution."18 
Nonetheless, the key to marginal analysis is straightforward: when the next 
increment of an activity yields benefits in excess of its costs, there is an 
incentive to engage in more of the activity. The second proposition instructs 
us that when the last increment costs more than its benefits, there is an 
incentive to engage in less of the activity. As a result, individuals adjust 
their consumption and production of goods and services in response to the 
marginal costs and benefits of those goods and services. When deciding 
whether to buy more of good A or good B, if the net marginal benefit of 
another unit of good A exceeds the net marginal benefit of another unit of 
B, people will buy the additional unit of A instead of the additional unit of 
B. Decisions in the environmental context are regularly made on the margin 
in setting ambient environmental quality standards, emissions levels, activ-
ity levels, and so forth. 
What happens when we make decisions without considering margins? 
There are multiple errors introduced by not thinking about margins, but one 
illustrative example will make the point. Not considering marginal costs 
and benefits means that we do not get the maximum environmental quality 
possible for a given expenditure leveL In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
EPA repeatedly considered whether to adopt a "bubble" policy for air emis-
sions from multiple points within a single facility.19 In essence, the policy 
question was whether the words "stationary source" in various sections of 
the Clean Air Act meant a single smokestack or could be interpreted to 
lump together all the smokestacks in an entire facility. Economists argued 
that allowing the facility to be treated as a single unit would result in more 
cost-effective pollution control because the marginal cost of emissions re-
ductions would differ across smokestacks. If the entire group of stacks in a 
facility were treated as a single stationary source, the plant owner would 
reduce emissions where it was cheapest to do so, yielding the same total 
emissions reduction at a lower cost. Treating each smokestack as a separate 
stationary source, on the other hand, would result in higher costs but no 
greater emissions reductions. Failing to consider margins increased the cost 
of environmental protection. (The legal debate over these issues-which 
produced the landmark Chevron decision-properly did not address the ec-
onomics, as Congress had neglected to do so in writing the statute.) 
18. See THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS: INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION 
(R.D. Collison Black et aI. eds., 1973). 
19. After two D.C. Circuit decisions by different panels, one rejecting the bubble concept in 
Clean Air Act new source context, ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and the 
other approving it in the Clean Air Act's "prevention of significant deterioration" context, Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the Supreme Court approved it in the 
context of EPA consideration of state implementation plans. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Perhaps much of this seems obvious. I hope so. Fundamental eco-
nomic principles are obvious because they describe what we all know from 
our day-to-day lives to be true. More importantly, since we are here to dis-
cuss a Christian perspective on the environment and the poor, none of them 
are incompatible with either a general Christian or a specifically Catholic 
view of human nature. The compatibility of the essentials of economics 
with Christian teachings is something that is hotly debated, and I certainly 
don't want to assert that every Christian or even every Catholic theologian 
is at heart a fan of markets. But market economics have a distinguished 
history in Christian and Catholic thought. For example, the Spanish Scho-
lastics (the School of Salamanca) built on the writings of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas to develop extended treatments of many economic issues and had 
considerable influence on thinkers like Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and the 
Physiocrats and, via those thinkers, an impact on Scottish Enlightenment 
figures including Adam Smith.20 And ever since Pope Leo XIII's encyclical 
Rerum Novarum in 1891, Catholic social teaching on economics has con-
sistently affirmed the legitimacy of the market, albeit with more qualifica-
tions and with somewhat less enthusiasm than Catholic and other free 
marketers might prefer?l 
From my own amateur and relatively untutored position as a lay Or-
thodox Christian, I find a comforting convergence between the dictates of 
faith and the dictates of economics. TANSTAAFL simply points out that 
choice among alternatives is a fundamental fact of existence, and I find in 
Christian teaching a guide to making choices. Both the Old and New Testa-
ments are filled with examples of incentives making a difference,22 and 
marginalism is fully compatible with the nature of choices we face. Indeed, 
as humans touched by original sin, we had best hope that God does not 
demand absolutes and that He will view choices for good on the margin as 
counting in our favor on Judgment Day. 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
When we apply economic principles to the environment, we discover 
that economics offers considerable guidance in how to best protect the envi-
20. ALEJANDRO A. CHAFUEN, FAITH AND LIBERTY: THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF THE LATE 
SCHOLASTICS 14-16 (2003). 
21. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 1-3 (discussing Papal critiques of the market while noting 
essential affirmation of the essentials of market economics). 
22. God's covenant with Israel in Exodus 19 is built around incentives. If the people ofIsrael 
agreed to "obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant," God offered them status as "a peculiar 
treasure to me above all people." Exodus 19:5. In the New Testament, Christ's parable of the 
Wicked Vinedressers is a classic case of mistaken beliefs about incentives. Matthew 21:33-46. 
The people who kill the servants and heir of the vineyard owner incorrectly believe that they can 
take the heir's inheritance by their actions. Instead, of course, the owner of the vineyard will "put 
those wretches to a miserable death" and give the vineyard to other tenants. Id. Had the tenants 
correctly perceived their incentives, as the parable is designed to teach us to do, they would have 
yielded up the fruits of the harvest to the landlord and received a much greater reward. 
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ronment, as well as sheds light on why environmental problems occur and 
why some regulatory efforts have failed to produce the promised results. 
Three core insights from economics for environmental policy capture the 
contributions that economic analysis can make to environmental policy 
debates. 
Proposition 4: Private property rights create incentives for responsible 
stewardship of resources. 
Garrett Hardin's 1968 article The Tragedy of the Commons has had a 
tremendous influence on environmentallaw.z3 My Westlaw search of the 
Journals and Law Reviews database turned up almost 1200 citations, an 
impressive total considering that much of Hardin's influence occurred 
before law review articles were included in the electronic library. Less often 
discussed is the fact that Hardin got his facts wrong with respect to the 
medieval English village commons from which he drew the central meta-
phor.24 (Even less frequently mentioned is that Hardin's article was prima-
rily an argument for authoritarian measures to limit population growth.?5 
Nonetheless, The Tragedy of the Commons has become the paradigm 
through which a multitude of environmental problems are viewed. 
One of Hardin's most important conclusions was that "private property 
or something formally like it" was a solution to commons' problems.26 
Property rights solve the tragedy of the commons because they provide 
property owners with the incentives to treat their land responsibly. Hardin's 
metaphor began with villagers deciding how many cattle to put on the com-
mon pasture. Each villager received all the benefit of each cow he added, 
since the cattle were privately owned. But since the pasture was held in 
common, each villager bore only a portion of the costs of the cattle, since 
the cattle ate grass belonging to all. Once the carrying capacity of the com-
mon pasture was reached, the net benefit to the village of adding an addi-
tional cow to the pasture was negative due to the impact of overgrazing on 
the existing cattle, while the net private benefit remained positive. When the 
commons was privatized, however, the owner of the pasture would not ex-
23. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCI., Dec. 1968, at 1243. 
24. Historically, villagers were limited by "stinting" rights, which governed the number of 
cattle each landowner could add to the pasture. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: 
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 224 n.3 (1990). 
25. Hardin, supra note 23, at 1248 ("Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all .... The only 
way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the free-
dom to breed, and that very soon."). 
26. [d. at 1245. As Prof. Adler notes, 
Hardin's reluctance to call for broader property rights in other environmental resources, 
such as air and water, stemmed from his belief that such resources 'cannot be readily 
fenced,' not out of any concern that the power of property rights to promote sound 
resource use was limited to farmlands and pastures. 
Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights 
& Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LmERTY 987, 1021 n.269 (2005). 
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ceed the carrying capacity of the pasture since the private and social bene-
fits were now identical. Private property thus prevents the tragedy of the 
commons. 
We observe such solutions with respect to many common resources. 
The use of individual tradable quotas in fisheries,27 customary allocation of 
lobstering rights by Maine "lobster gangs,"28 and customary range rights 
enforced by cattlemen's associations on open ranges29 are just a few of the 
examples. In general, property rights solve the commons problem because 
they give the owner the incentive to maximize the total stream of benefits 
from his property, including its future value. Since poor management of a 
resource reduces the net present value of the stream of future benefits from 
a resource, even an owner who is ignorant of appropriate resource manage-
ment has an incentive to learn to do better, to hire someone who knows 
better methods, or to sell to someone who knows better management tech-
niques because doing so increases the value of the resource to the owner 
himself. 
Moreover, private property rights allow the fullest exploitation of local 
knowledge. Economist Friedrich Hayek's seminal 1945 article, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society,30 pointed out the critical importance of the knowl-
edge each individual has. When resource management decisions are made 
by people other than the resource owner, there is an inevitable loss of such 
knowledge. Hayek argued that local knowledge was sufficiently important 
that it precluded centralized economic planning;31 his critique is equally 
relevant to centralized environmental planning. In 1945, Hayek noted that 
much of economic analysis assumed "all the relevant information," a 
known system of preferences, and "complete knowledge."32 As a result, the 
problem of allocation of resources became "purely one of logic" because 
"the answer to the question of what is the best use of the available means is 
implicit in our assumptions."33 This characterization of the "economic 
problem" missed the point, Hayek argued, because "[t]he peculiar character 
of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the 
27. See Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 18-22,40-41 (2002); Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through 
Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
3, 17-20 (2004) (discussing success of individual tradable quotas programs). 
28. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (describing informal 
property rights system used to allocate lobster fishing areas and prevent overharvesting). 
29. See Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider 
Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 581 (1998); TERRY L. 
ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT So WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRON. 
TIER 148-58 (2004). 
30. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
31. [d. at 524 ("[C]entral planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take 
direct account of these circumstances of time and place .... "). 
32. [d. at 519. 
33. [d. 
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fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use 
never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed 
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess."34 
Local knowledge is relevant to a wide variety of environmental 
problems. Polluters have considerable local knowledge about their produc-
tion processes and other details of their facilities that provide them with 
important advantages in finding ways to reduce emissions. Landowners 
have local knowledge about their land that allows better stewardship. Fish-
ermen familiar with a particular stream often know river conditions better 
than distant planners. This does not mean that outsiders have nothing to 
contribute to environmental debates-governments often have the resources 
to produce and distribute scientific knowledge that improves decision mak-
ing, for example. What it means, however, is that better results often come 
from leaving resources in private hands and offering incentives for im-
proved environmental results, rather than attempting to dictate the method 
of achieving environmental goals. 
Private property rights are certainly compatible with Christian doc-
trine, and the Spanish Scholastics offered justifications for private property 
that are remarkably similar to the economic analysis of the commons prob-
lem. For example, Tomas de Mercado argued that: 
We cannot find a person who does not favor his own interests or 
who does not prefer to furnish his own home rather than that of 
the republic. We can see that privately owned property flourishes, 
while city- and council-owned property suffers from inadequate 
care and worse management. In this regard, Aristotle states that 
the pleasure that a man feels while working at his own business is 
inevitable. It is not easy to explain how important it is for man to 
know that he is the owner of the thing he produces. On the other 
hand, people treat common enterprises with great indiffer-
ence .... After man's loss of innocence, it becomes necessary for 
each individual to share in the things of this world, in real estate 
or movable riches .... If universal love will not induce people to 
take care of things, private interest will. Hence, privately owned 
goods will multiply. Had they remained in common possession, 
the opposite would be true. 35 
The conclusion seems inescapable that if we are to solve commons 
problems, we must resort either to "private property or something formally 
like it" or to the type of authoritarian solutions that Hardin suggested in his 
article were necessary to prevent over-population. Between those alterna-
tives, the choice seems remarkably easy. 
34. Id. 
35. TOMAS DE MERCADO, SUMMA DE TRATOS y CONTRATOS bk. 2, chap. 2, fol. 19 (Seville, 
1571), quoted in CHAFUEN, supra note 20, at 34-35. 
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Proposition 5: Markets allow minority preferences to be satisfied. 
Modern American environmental activists often have a peculiar gap in 
their historical memories. They recall Eden-like conditions that prevailed in 
North America before the arrival of European settlers with startling clar-
ity-clarity that is all the more startling because their recollections are often 
of conditions that never existed.36 They often do not recall that earlier gen-
erations were just as concerned about the environment as they are today, 
albeit with different preferences shaped by both different world views and 
different resources. One particularly dramatic class of prior environmental 
management decisions that are now generally believed to have been signifi-
cant mistakes were the predator eradication programs popular in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.37 Eradication of wolves in the west 
and eradication of rap tors more generally were steps undertaken by people 
concerned with the environment and intent on "improving" it. That we now 
believe they were wrong does not alter the fact that these earlier managers 
of the environment believed they were behaving as responsible stewards of 
the land. 
Control of predators, particularly wolves and raptors, was undertaken 
with public support and public resources. 38 Bounties were paid, habitat de-
stroyed, and animals and birds slaughtered by the thousands in an effort to 
"improve" the environment. Not everyone agreed that eradicating predators 
was a good idea, however, and a few individuals were able to use private 
funds to lease and purchase crucial habitat to sustain the threatened species. 
In Pennsylvania, Rosalie Edge saved vital hawk breeding territories by first 
leasing and ultimately purchasing them in private transactions. Using her 
market-acquired property rights, she established the Hawk Mountain re-
serve and not only saved the area's hawks from slaughter but contributed to 
changing public opinion about the desirability of raptor eradication. 
Had the question of raptor eradication been put to a vote in 1900, it is 
likely that a majority of Americans would have endorsed it as an environ-
mentally sensible public policy goal. But because economic markets, unlike 
political markets, are not winner-take-all forums, those who dissented from 
the majority view were able to satisfy their own preferences by acting in the 
marketplace. 
When markets are not allowed to function, however, minority prefer-
ences are often overridden with environmentally dangerous consequences. 
36. See Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55 CASE W. REs. 
L. REV. 51, 69-71 (2004) (discussing attempts to restore forests to "pre-European" conditions). 
37. See HANK FISCHER, WOLF WARS 17-23 (1995) (discussing history of wolf eradication 
programs); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, & Public Health: 
Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16-22 (2002) 
(discussing pesticide spraying programs). 
38. See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning, 
14 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 95, 128-29 (2000) (detailing the Hawk Mountain story). 
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To take but one example, consider the aerial spraying of pesticides to con-
trol the gypsy moth on Long Island, New York in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.39 Federally funded efforts to eradicate the pest led to blanket spray-
ing of private and public land alike, despite the extremely limited nature of 
the infestation. Landowners who objected, including bird enthusiasts and 
organic farmers, repeatedly sought relief in the courts to stop the spraying 
of their property. Their objections were overridden as the court held: "[t]he 
rights of individuals are not limitless. Individuals must yield to the require-
ments of the public as a whole."40 
These specific examples illustrate a general principle: environmental 
policies are rarely simple "yes/no" choices. Disagreements over the appro-
priate approach to an environmental issue regularly appear and the "right" 
answer often changes over time as new information appears, new theories 
are tested, and new approaches discovered. An important advantage of mar-
ket-based solutions is that they allow multiple approaches to coexist, both 
with respect to finding the best way to an agreed goal and with respect to 
satisfying a diverse set of preferences for environmental goods. Unless we 
are extremely confident that we know the truth, allowing a diversity of pref-
erences and approaches is likely to be the best approach in the long run. The 
historical record suggests that allowing minority preferences like Rosalie 
Edge's love of hawks to be satisfied through market transactions produces 
environmentally superior outcomes. Unfortunately, sometimes we confuse 
our knowledge of eternal Truths such as the divinity of Christ with our 
imperfect knowledge of the world in which we live today. Assuming that 
our generation has found the depth of knowledge necessary to dictate how 
everyone is to behave seems inconsistent with St. Peter's injunction that we 
"be clothed with humility."41 
Proposition 6: Rent-seeking is pervasive in environmental regulation. 
Psalm 146 cautions to "[p]ut not your trust in princes, nor in the son of 
man."42 The economic analysis of politics in general and of environmental 
regulation in particular, reinforces this lesson.43 "Economic rents" are pay-
ments that go beyond the cost of providing a service. 
Most people spend a considerable amount of their lives looking 
for rents. We all want to be paid more than enough to get us to 
work each day. We are rent-seekers, one and all. Seeking rents in 
the political arena can have a higher payoff than seeking rents in 
39. See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 37, at 16-22 (discussing Long Island pesticide spray-
ing controversy). 
40. Murphy v. Benson, 164 F. Supp. 120, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). 
41. 1 Peter 5:5 (King James). 
42. Psalm 146:3 (King James). 
43. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE ill (2003) for a summary of public choice 
theory. 
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the world of work. The reason is simple: With the stroke of a pen 
a politician can cause vast amounts of resources to be transferred 
from taxpayers or consumers to the providers of politically fa-
vored services. For example, reducing automobile exhaust emis-
sions improves air quality. How is a regulator to do so? By 
specifying that all automobiles must have catalytic converters to 
reduce emissions brought huge profits to the owner of patents on 
key technology, which happened to be General Motors. Air qual-
ity improves and GM makes more money. 44 
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Thus despite lofty language in some environmental statutes setting un-
realistic zero discharge goals,45 environmental regulation largely consists of 
the distribution and redistribution of valuable rights by regulators.46 For 
example, when regulators restrict construction on some beachfront lots, 
they increase the value of neighboring lots where construction is allowed by 
limiting the supply of beachfront property.47 Allocations of emissions rights 
to particular sources provides the recipients with valuable legal rights and I 
have argued elsewhere that car and truck manufacturers are engaged in a 
competition with stationary sources for emissions rights in the context of 
the Clean Air Act's State Implementation Plans.48 Because of the value of 
these rights, people are willing to invest considerable resources to obtain 
them. If the rights are allocated through the marketplace, those investments 
will be made by paying the seller for the rights. If the rights are distributed 
through the political process, however, the only way to influence their allo-
cation is to influence the political process. Interest groups that can profit 
from the allocation of rights will thus seek to influence rights distribution 
by influencing legislators and regulators. 
Interest groups need not resort to anything as crude as outright bribery 
to gain influence. Even the most publicly-minded candidate must accumu-
late significant funds to gain election or reelection and doing so generally 
requires providing interest groups capable of delivering those funds with 
something. The result is that interest groups and political considerations 
play considerable roles in environmental policy. Examples range from the 
classic "Clean Coal/Dirty Air" coalition of environmental groups and east-
ern coal interests during the debate over the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments that produced statutory provisions that disadvantaged cleaner western 
coal relative to more polluting eastern coal49 to the legendary clout of 
44. ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LITIGA-
TION (forthcoming 2008). 
45. 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(I) (1977) ("[Ilt is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants 
into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."). 
46. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000). 
47. See note 11 and associated text supra discussing the facts of the Lucas case. 
48. See Morriss, supra note 46 (discussing this competition). 
49. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR (1981). 
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Michigan Rep. John Dingell, whose efforts on behalf of Detroit's auto mak-
ers produced the term "Dingell-gram" for the summonses he issued to regu-
lators to appear before his committee to answer for regulations that harmed 
Detroit's interests.50 Good government cannot be presumed to be the result 
of entrusting power to fallible men and women, for the human flaws that 
afflict private behavior are still present when those same individuals enter 
the public sector. As economist Rick Stroup has noted, the general problem 
is that good government is itself a public good and is thus underprovided in 
the marketplace.51 
These second three propositions make the point that markets are not 
incompatible with the environment. That does not mean markets always 
produce the environmentally preferred outcome, however defined. It does 
mean that a market-based society that allows decentralized decision-making 
by holders of private property rights protected by tort, property, and con-
tract law is not inherently problematic for environmental quality. But what 
about the poor? How will applying market principles affect them? 
WHAT ABOUT THE POOR? 
Catholic social thought and Christian social thought generally has pro-
duced a great deal of insight into Christians' obligations toward the pOOr.52 
Economists also have a great deal to say about poverty and much of it 
consists of pointing out fallacies upon which anti-poverty policies often 
rest. For example, many people incorrectly believe that raising the mini-
mum wage will improve the economic position of the poor.53 A vast 
amount of empirical evidence supports this consensus. 54 It should not take a 
Ph.D. in economics to understand why raising the minimum wage is likely 
to hurt those without jobs by making hiring them more expensive, particu-
50. Richard J. Leon, Congressional Investigations: Are Partisan Politics Undermining Our 
Vital Institutions?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 825, 827 (1997-98), stating: 
And when one focuses on congressional oversight, nobody in the modern history of 
Congress was more admired, and feared, than ... John Dingell. Congressman Dingell 
... conducted oversight investigations of the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Food and Drug Administration, and other agencies, that to this day are legendary. Gov-
ernment employees used to quake in their boots when they received requests for infor-
mation known as 'Dingellgrams' at their agencies. 
51. Richard L. Stroup, Free Riders and Collective Action Revisited, 4 INDEP. REv. 485, 485 
(2000) ("The formation and successful control of a government program in the public interest, for 
any reasonable definition of that nebulous term, are themselves public goods."). 
52. As an Orthodox Christian, I am particularly glad that I share with my Catholic friends the 
sermons of St. John Chyrsostom on the parable of Lazarus and the rich man, which predate the 
division between the Eastern and Western Churches. See ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, ON WEALTH 
AND POVERTY (Catharine P. Roth trans., St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1984), which is instructive 
on the dangers of wealth. 
53. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 50-71 (a particularly instructive analysis of wage issues 
from a Catholic market perspective). 
54. See Donald Deere, Kevin M. Murphy, and Finis Welch, Sense and Nonsense on the 
Minimum Wage, 18 REGULATION No.1, at 47 (1995) (reviewing evidence on minimum wage 
impacts). 
2008] THE NECESSITY OF ECONOMICS 199 
larly since the advocates of the federal minimum wage explicitly designed it 
to make certain types of employment uneconomical. 55 From the frequency 
with which raising the minimum wage is proposed as a solution to poverty, 
however, it appears that it does take a level of economic sophistication be-
yond that possessed by the average politician and, by implication, the aver-
age voter. 
Let me stress that the issue is not the intentions behind efforts to help 
the environment that lead to bad outcomes for the poor. The question is 
whether such efforts actually help or harm. Bjorn Lomborg closes his book 
on global warming, Cool It, by saying 
I hope we can look the coming generations squarely in the eyes 
and say that we didn't just do what seemed fashionably good; we 
massively and thoroughly changed the world for the better 
through simple, tested, and cool strategies. We didn't just do 
something that made us feel good; we did something that actually 
did good.56 
To effectively address the needs of the poor, we must adapt our efforts 
to the world, not attempt to force the world to fit within preconceived no-
tions about how the world works. As Thomas Woods argues, quoting Greg-
ory Gronbacher, "[t]here are fundamental market realities that cannot be 
ignored for any reason, including moral concerns, because, in so doing, 
further harm may result to both market mechanisms and morality." This 
critical point can no longer be overlooked. As Etienne Gilson put it, "Piety 
is no substitute for technique."57 I will therefore address the question of the 
impact of market-based environmental solutions for the poor by offering 
three additional propositions that capture key insights of economic analysis 
on some of the most important aspects of environmental law. 
Proposition 7: People with fewer resources do better in economic 
markets than they do in political markets. 
The literature on the poor and the environment-which goes loosely 
by the name "environmental justice"-tends to focus on the location of pol-
lution sources near poor neighborhoods, the alleged laxness of emissions 
standards near poor neighborhoods, and so forth. In addition to assuming 
55. See Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. 
LEGIS. 151, 155-56 (1989-90) ("[T]he appropriate response to the argument that the minimum 
wage hurts the very people it is supposed to protect is: the minimum wage helps those marginal 
workers by forcing their inefficient employers either to rationalize or to be driven out of business 
by more efficient competitors paying higher wages."). 
56. LOMBORG, supra note 7, at 164. Lomborg's conscience should be clear on this score. His 
"Copenhagen Consensus" project has produced some of the clearest thinking about environmental 
priorities, taking into account scarcity and tradeoffs. See Copenhagen Consensus Center, Copen-
hagen Consensus 2008, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.comlDefault.aspx?ID=788 (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2008). 
57. WOODS, supra note 2, at 9 (citations omitted). 
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that there is a zero, or perhaps even negative, sum game being played over 
the location of facilities (which I think is largely false-see my next pro-
position), these complaints miss an essential point: being poor (defined as 
not having resources) means you don't have the things that resources get 
you. Among those things that you don't have are nice locations for your 
housing. More importantly, it also means that you lack the resources to do 
well in both political and economic markets. What I want to argue now is 
that the poor do worse in political markets relative to economic markets, 
and so shifting decisions from the economic marketplace to the political 
marketplace disadvantages the poor relative to the rich. 
In economic markets, the poor have few resources but they do have 
some resources. Businesses can make money by meeting the needs of the 
poor and often do. For example, Wal-Mart saves consumers money, which 
benefits the poor disproportionately58 and does so through a strategy that 
targets price-conscious consumers. The poor may not get as much as the 
rich in the economic marketplace, but they do get something. 
In contrast, the political marketplace discriminates heavily against the 
poor. It does so in many ways; let us consider just three. First, the political 
marketplace often makes winner-take-all decisions, unlike the economic 
marketplace which has room for both Wal-Mart and Nordstrom's. If only 
one set of preferences is going to be satisfied, it seems unlikely that it 
would be the preferences of the group with fewer resources. Second, most 
voters are rationally ignorant of the details of political proposals and politi-
cal candidates' policies.59 Correctly reasoning that their vote is unlikely to 
make a difference in the outcome of an election or a legislature's vote on a 
proposed law, voters rarely invest in becoming informed consumers of poli-
ticians to the same extent they invest in making a choice between a Ford 
and a Chevrolet. As a result, the public choice literature has documented the 
tendency of political markets to deliver benefits concentrated on a few at 
costs distributed to many. Again, the most likely winners in such a competi-
tion are those who can afford "access" to politicians, which comes at con-
siderable cost. Finally, the political marketplace makes decisions in state 
capitals and Washington, D.C., locations that are remote from the lives of 
most Americans. (The same holds true in other nations, of course). Navigat-
58. See Jeny Hausman & Ephraim Leibtag, Consumer Benefits from Increased Competition 
in Shopping Outlets: Measuring the Effect of Wal-Mart, MIT and Economic Research Service, 
U.S. Dept. of Ag. Revised Draft (Oct. 2005), available at http://econ-www.mit.edulfilesI1765. 
59. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. 
L. REv. 511, n.63 (2000-01), stating: 
Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency of citizens to pay little attention to 
political infonnation. The phenomenon occurs because acquiring infonnation about 
politics is both costly and unproductive. It is costly because, to acquire such infonna-
tion, individuals must invest time that they could be using in other more lucrative or 
pleasurable enterprises. It is unproductive because, although the principal instrumental 
use of such infonnation is to guide voting, the vote of anyone individual is unlikely to 
influence the outcome of an election. 
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ing the corridors of power or deciphering the pages of the latest proposal in 
the Federal Register requires specialized expertise from lawyers and lobby-
ists, neither of which are readily accessible to the poor. Shifting decisions 
from the economic marketplace to the political marketplace disadvantages 
the poor.60 Unfortunately, that is what many environmental laws and regu-
lations do. 
Moreover, governments have the means (coercion) to solve free rider 
problems. But their efficiency stems from being good at coercion, which 
overcomes free riding at relatively low cost. But that coercive power is 
dangerous precisely because it is so efficient. It tempts people to use it for 
their own benefit. Institutions that protect us from special interests' ability 
to divert the power of the state to their own benefit also reduce our ability to 
accomplish through the state laudable goals as well. For example, bicamer-
alism is a fundamental part of the American system of government and 
guarantor of individual liberty, yet its method of protecting liberty is to 
deliberately make government inefficient.61 
Nobel laureate James Buchanan, who won the prize for his innovations 
in public choice theory, debated the equally eminent public finance econo-
mist Richard Musgrave in a series of lectures in 1998. In the course of their 
debate, Buchanan summarized the difference between his point of view, 
which focuses on the dangers of unconstrained power, and Musgrave's, 
which focused on the potential provision of worthwhile public goods 
through a government solution of the free rider problem. Buchanan put it 
this way: 
I raised this question: Don't you feel that under certain circum-
stances, you would want to constrain the government? And I said, 
for example, suppose you had a tiger, a pet tiger. Wouldn't you 
want to have a muzzle on that pet tiger in case he might bite 
somebody? So you put him on a muzzle. And Richard Musgrave 
said, oh I wouldn't want to do that because I might want the tiger 
to eat the grass.62 
If government is a tiger, and the great weight of the evidence suggests 
that governments' claws and teeth are sharp, then Buchanan's prescription 
of a muzzle is a vital caution. And the first to be bitten, after all, are hardly 
likely to be the rich and powerful, so this is a matter of concern for the 
60. As Professor Hill noted to me in commenting on an earlier draft of this article, shifting 
decisions from the marketplace to politics is not only unlikely to help the poor given their relative 
disadvantages in the latter, but is likely to shift the balance of power even more in favor of the 
well-connected because the re-ordering of economic affairs sufficiently to change economic ine-
quality requires a substantial increase in political power. 
61. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) ("In purely practical terms, it is 
obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is 
crystal clear ... that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency."). 
62. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: 
Two CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 88-89 (1999). 
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poor. For example, a recent study by the Institute for Justice found that 
eminent domain powers exercised in pursuit of "economic development" 
are most often used against the poor,63 evidence that the powers of the state 
are at best a two-edged sword for those concerned with the welfare of the 
powerless. 
Proposition 8: Trade creates wealth. 
The fundamental problem with being poor is that you are poor-that 
is, by definition, you lack resources. Not having resources is bad, at least in 
this life.64 Market economies excel at creating economic growth, which 
makes everyone, including the poor better off.65 The best way for people to 
stop being poor, therefore, is for them to live in a society in which eco-
nomic freedom allows individuals to trade with one another without inter-
ference. This brings us to one of the most important contributions of 
economic theory: comparative advantage, which is the basis of trade. As 
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson noted, comparative advantage is a proposi-
tion that is both true and nontrivial. Its truth can be established by mathe-
matical deduction as well as through empirical studies. That it is non-trivial 
is "attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have 
never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it 
was explained to them. "66 
The implications of this for environmental law and policy is that it 
becomes important independently of the implications for environmental 
quality that environmental protection laws and regulations interfere to the 
smallest extent possible, consistent with achieving their goals, with the 
overall functioning of the economy. For example, suppose we can reach an 
air pollution goal either by mandating across-the-board reductions for all 
sources or through a tradable permit system that allows sources to reduce 
emissions beyond the across-the-board level and sell credits to other 
sources, who would then be relieved of the requirement to reduce to the 
across-the-board level. The former method costs more to implement than 
the latter method because it does not take into account differences in the 
63. See DICK M. CARPENIER II & JOHN K. Ross, rnsT. OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING THE VUL-
NERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 6 (2007) ("Losses from eminent do-
main abuse 'fall disproportionately on the poor,' and particularly on minorities."). 
64. One response suggested by a commentator on an earlier draft is that there are plenty of 
people who think the poor are better off being poor and so it was necessary to specify a theory 
about what we want for the poor. I am assuming that the goal of concern for the poor is the 
alleviation of poverty. We may not succeed, but our obligation, like that of the rich man in the 
parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man from Luke's Gospel, is to do our best to succeed. 
65. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS 3 (2007) ("There have been benefits [from 
economic growth following the Industrial Revolution] aplenty for the typically wealthy owners of 
land or capital, and for the educated. But industrialized economies saved their best gifts for the 
poorest."). 
66. PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUEL-
SON 683 (1972). 
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cost of reduction amongst sources. Environmentally the two methods of 
pollution control may produce identical outcomes, but the across-the-board 
method will reduce economic activity more than the latter. The cost of this 
foregone economic activity is likely to be disproportionately borne by the 
poor. 
A classic example of how environmental policies that do not take mar-
ket principles into account harm the poor is the impact of U.S. policies 
promoting ethanol on Mexico's poor. In large part because of the environ-
mentally-driven67 subsidies for corn-based ethanol production in the United 
States, corn prices have risen dramatically, producing a quadrupling of tor-
tilla prices in Mexico.68 These same policies also produce environmental 
problems, by leading to more intensive farming techniques and expansion 
of mono-crop agriculture. 69 
It is also crucial to consider that trade creates wealth; it does not redis-
tribute it.7° When people engage in voluntary trade, there is more wealth 
after the trade than before it. (If there wasn't, people would not engage in 
the trade.) Since poverty is defined by the absence of wealth, the. creation of 
wealth is fundamental to reducing poverty. Not only are the poor more 
likely to bear the brunt of any restrictions on trade relative to other groups, 
the absolute impact on the poor is also likely to be larger than on any other 
group. 
Moreover, thinking about trade raises the critical question of to which 
poor we are to give a preferential option. The average caloric consumption 
in the industrialized countries is almost twice that in the poorest region of 
Africa.71 Environmental policy debates that fail to address improving lifes-
tyles for the poor in developed economies cannot be said to be considering 
seriously the preferential option for the poor. 
67. Special interest politics are a key reason for ethanol subsidies, but I am assuming that the 
ethanol program has an environmental goal here which makes the argument I am advancing 
stronger. See Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, 19 REGULATION No.4, 
at 26 (1996), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg19n4b.html (describing rent 
seeking in 1990s ethanol programs). 
68. Manuel Roig-Franzia, A Culinmy and Cultural Staple in Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 
2007, at AI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlartic1e/2007 /01126/ AR 
2007012601896_pf.html. 
69. See David Pimentel, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance, Economics, and Environmental Im-
pacts are Negative, 12 NAT. RESOURCES REs., June 2003, at 127. 
70. This is true of the rise of market economies generally. As economic historian Gregory 
Clark writes, 
[G]rowth in capitalist economies since the Industrial Revolution strongly promoted 
greater equality. Despite fears that machines would swallow up men, the greatest benefi-
ciaries of the Industrial Revolution so far have been unskilled workers. 
CLARK, supra note 65, at 11. 
71. Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Statistics Division, Food Security Statis-
tics (2007), http://www.fao.org/es/ess/faostatlfoodsecurity/index_en.htm. 
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Proposition 9: Wealth increases the demand for environmental goods and 
services as well as reducing poverty. 
Curing poverty implies making poor people wealthier. But wealth not 
only makes a person less poor, it also changes a person's preferences. At 
the most basic level, people demand many environmental goods and ser-
vices after they have satisfied more basic needs for food and shelter. There 
is evidence of an environmental Kuznets curve with respect to at least some 
environmental quality issues, where demand increases once income per cap-
ita has exceeded about $5,000 per year.72 Caring for the poor by helping to 
make them less poor is thus likely to have beneficial consequences for the 
environment. Addressing poverty is good for the environment as well as for 
the poor. 
But wait-won't all those newly middle class people want cars, big 
screen TVs, and other consumer goods? Won't they want to move into 
larger, suburban homes? If we let the poor out of their inner-city ghettos, 
won't they want to be like the rest of us? And if they do become like us, 
won't they adopt lots of terrible middle class habits, like consuming more 
energy, more stuff, and more space? As Italian journalist Carla Ravaioli 
asked many of the world's leading economists in her book Economists and 
the Environment: what do we do when the Chinese all want cars?73 
It seems likely that the poor will want many of the things richer folks 
now have once they are no longer poor. They will want bigger houses with 
more energy-using appliances; they'll want new cars, and some may even 
want SUV s. They will buy more things, throwaway the packaging, and 
only occasionally recycle. Is this bad news for the environment? 
There are three possible responses to this question. The first is implicit 
in many environmental pressure groups' critiques of American society: 
Yes, it is an environmental disaster if poor people start acting like middle 
class Americans, particularly poor people in other countries. As a result, we 
need to find a way to keep the poor from developing our bad habits. Since 
this essentially means that the poor have to stay poor until some miraculous 
technological innovation appears to allow them to improve their living stan-
dards without causing any adverse environmental impact, I think anyone 
who takes seriously a preferential option for the poor must reject it outright. 
(Alternatively, some authoritarian solution might be adopted to reduce peo-
ple's living standards who aren't currently poor to provide both an in-
creased quality of life for the poor and an increased environmental quality.) 
72. See BRUCE YANDLE, MADHUSUDAN BHA'ITARAI & MAYA VIJAYARAGHAVAN, PROP. & 
ENVTL. RESEARCH CENTER, ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A REvmw OF FINDINGS, METH-
ODS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2004), available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_1a.pdf. 
73. CARLA RAVAIOLI WITH A CONTRIBUTION BY PAUL EKINS, ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (Richard Bates trans., Zed Books 1995) (1984). 
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The second is to agree that the environmental impact of reducing pov-
erty is likely to be negative but to accept it as inevitable. This is unaccept-
able as well. 1.322 billion Chinese driving the equivalent of Hummers (or, 
perhaps worse, Toyota Priuses?4 would have a major environmental impact 
that likely would have a number of unacceptable consequences for the Chi-
nese as well as the rest of the world. 
The third response is the only one that is both likely and the only one 
that is morally acceptable. Among those 1.322 billion Chinese drivers are a 
vast number of poets, artists, musicians, engineers, scientists, lawyers, doc-
tors, and people of every other human profession. Some one or more of 
those Hummer-driving new consumers may well be the person who finds a 
solution to some of these problems. As economist Julian Simon said, hu-
manity is the "ultimate resource,"75 and it is in humanity that we will find 
solutions to problems that seem unimaginably complex and unsolvable to-
day. Man is a creative being, in no small part because we are made in the 
image of the One who created us. And we are to use our creativity: in the 
Parable of the Talents, it was the servants who received five and two talents 
and who invested them and earned returns for their lord who were bid to 
"enter into the joy of your lord" while the servant who received only one 
talent and who did nothing but hid the money to keep it safe was "cast into 
outer darkness."76 
CONCLUSION 
It is beyond doubt that economics provides a useful description of im-
portant properties of the world in which we live (propositions 1-3), that its 
principles provide a useful guide to improving the environment (proposi-
tions 4-6), and that by understanding and heeding those principles we can 
harmonize our concern for the poor with our concern for the natural world 
(propositions 7-9). Together those support my bolder claim: that economics 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of moral analysis of environ-
mental problems. 
Proposition 10: Economic analysis provides moral clarity that enables us 
to provide a preferential option for the poor. 
To make this case, let us consider three environmental dilemmas that 
implicate the demands of Christianity that we give a preferential option to 
74. See CNW MARKETING RESEARCH, DUST TO DUST: THE ENERGY COST OF NEW VEHICLES 
FROM CONCEPT TO DISPOSAL (2005), available at http://cnwmr.com/nss-folder/automotiveenergy/ 
DUST%20PDF%20VERSION.pdf (finding that environmental impact of Prius greater than that of 
Hummer). 
75. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981) and THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE II 
(1996). 
76. Matthew 14:31 (King James). 
206 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:1 
the poor and ask what economics can contribute to the moral understanding 
of each. 
Dilemma 1: Air pollution: reductions on the margin. 
A major air pollution control initiative in the United States is EPA's 
proposed revision of the federal air quality standard for ozone. According to 
EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), reducing the acceptable level of 
ozone to 0.075 ppm from 0.084 ppm would cost between $5.5 and $8.8 
billion and yield net benefits of $7.3 to $16 billion, depending on the as-
sumptions and methods used to estimate the costs and benefits.77 Although 
there are many questions about the validity of much of the science underly-
ing the proposal,78 let us accept these calculations as a reasonable estimate 
of the standard's costs and benefits. 
Air pollution in developing countries is also a problem. The major air 
pollution problem in much of the world stems from the use of solid fuels 
indoors (in particular, the use of wood, dung, and crop residues) for heat 
and cooking.79 The World Health Organization concluded that 
Globally, reliance on solid fuels has emerged as one of the ten 
most important threats to public health. In 2000, indoor air pollu-
tion was responsible for more than 1.5 million deaths and 2.7% of 
the global burden of disease. In high-mortality developing coun-
tries, it accounted for 3.7% of the burden of disease, making it the 
most important risk factor after malnutrition, the HIV / AIDS epi-
demic and lack of safe water and adequate sanitation. Indoor air 
pollution disproportionately affects women and children who 
spend the most time near the domestic hearth.80 
Economic analysis provides a framework for comparing the impact of 
spending on reducing the level of ozone in the United States and on ad-
dressing indoor air pollution issues in developing countries. It is not an 
answer to this dilemma to say that we must do both, for resources spent on 
one are unavailable to the other. Given the resources we have, where should 
we spend those resources? An economic analysis puts the choice in stark 
terms, forcing us to confront the reality that a choice to focus our resources 
on the relatively small marginal improvements a more stringent ozone stan-
77. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, EXECUTNE SUMMARY, TBL. ES.2 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/ttniecas/regdata/RIAs/ozoneriaexecsum.pdf. 
78. See, e.g., Joel Schwartz, How Environmentalists and Scientists Mislead Americans About 
Air Pollution and Climate Change, Planet Gore on National Review Online (Sept. 14, 2007) 
(critiquing the Natural Resources Defense Council's report, HEAT ADVISORY: How GLOBAL 
WARMING CAUSES MORE BAD AIR DAYS (2007)), available at http://planetgore.nationalreview. 
com!posti?q=ZDNiNDIyODIONTdiMjRlY2UyMTYxMmRiY2YyMzk4ZWY=. 
79. WHO, INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: NATIONAL BURDEN OF DISEASE ESTIMATES 1 (2007), 
available at http://www. who.intiindCiorair/publications/indoocaicnationaCburden_estimate_re-
vised.pdf. 
80. [d. 
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dard could bring can only be justified if we value the time and lives of 
Americans significantly more highly than we value the time and lives of the 
poor whose lives could be dramatically improved by addressing indoor air 
pollution. A full analysis of the details of the calculations necessary to make 
such an assessment is well beyond the scope of this paper, but even back-
of-the-envelope calculations suggest that there is such an overwhelmingly 
larger marginal benefit possible from addressing indoor air pollution in the 
developing world than addressing ozone standards in the United States that 
the choice is likely to be obvious. 
Dilemma 2: Trade in endangered species. 
Both the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Convention on the Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) prohibit virtually all trade in 
endangered species and products made from endangered species. In particu-
lar, there is a ban on trade in ivory products that is intended to help preserve 
African elephants. Philosopher David Schmidtz examined the incentives 
created by the ban and concluded that the result was to increase killing of 
elephants, as it turned elephants from a resource worth preserving into one 
with only negative economic impacts.81 
But, as Schmidtz notes, preserving elephants also entailed killing 
some. Herds had to be culled to keep them within manageable sizes given 
the food supplies in nature preserves. Making the elephants the property of 
the neighboring villages gave the elephants' neighbors a reason to tolerate 
the destruction the elephants cause and helped the poor by providing them 
with a new economic resource. But giving the elephants to the villagers also 
meant the villagers would sell the right to hunt some of the elephants. 
There are powerful reasons to find a preservation policy built around 
killing elephants unacceptable, including the fact that elephants are suffi-
ciently self-aware to have some understanding of the death of their fellows. 
As Schmidtz summarizes, elephants 
are not the kind of creature that we have a right to treat as mere 
means. Cynthia Moss [director of the Amboseli Elephant Re-
search Project] ... said she would rather see elephants go extinct 
than see individual animals murdered for sake of population con-
trol, and she is not alone. If elephants had a voice in the matter, 
perhaps they would thank Moss for her stand. Perhaps not. 82 
Yet the problem is that preservationism alone will not preserve. As 
Schrnidtz concludes 
81. David Schmidtz, When Preservation ism Doesn't Preserve, 6 ENVTL. VALUES 327 (1997), 
reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS 320 
(David Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott eds., 2002) (discussing elephant preservation dilemmas). 
82. [d. at 327. 
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I have come to realize that preservationism often and predictably 
does not work in the context of a social arrangement in which the 
cost of upholding preservationist ideals has to be born by people 
who do not embrace those ideals. Even given that preservationism 
is acceptable as a personal ideal, it remains a bad idea to create 
institutions that depend upon people who do not share that ideal 
to take responsibility for realizing it. 83 
Preservationism does not preserve because it fails to take into account 
some of the basic economic propositions discussed in this article. Failing to 
do so means elephant preservation efforts will not succeed. It also means 
that the large numbers of poor people who live near elephants will suffer. 
As Schmidtz notes, elephants are pests when they are your neighbors-
they trample crops and fences. Unless people can profit from the elephants, 
they have no reason to choose to tolerate the wildlife's depredations.84 Tak-
ing care of the poor, by making them able to profit from the elephants, also 
became a way of taking care of the elephants, since it helped to ensure their 
survival as a species. Economic analysis provides a clear view of the insti-
tutions and their incentives necessary to this crucial insight. The choices are 
not easy, but without an economic framework they cannot be understood. 
Dilemma 3: DDT and malaria. 
The virtually world-wide ban of DDT was one of the most important early 
symbolic victories of the new environmental pressure groups that emerged 
in the 1960s and early 1970s.85 Spurred by Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, 
environmentalists rallied against the pesticide and largely forced it from the 
scene. But DDT turns out to be remarkably effective in controlling mala-
ria-a pestilence that kills the equivalent of the number of passengers in 
seven 747s per day86-and its low cost makes it particularly well-suited for 
poorer, developing countries still plagued by the disease.87 
An economic analysis of the question of DDT use forces people to 
confront the tradeoffs between the environmental impact of DDT use and 
the cost in human lives and misery caused by foregoing its use. This is not 
an easy calculation to make, nor is the long delay by the developed world in 
responding to the growing crisis of malaria in many developing countries 
83. Id. at 328. 
84. Id. at 322 ("Whether we like it or not, the elephants will not survive except by sharing the 
land with people, which means their long-term survival depends on whether the people of Africa 
can afford to share."). 
85. See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 38, at 23-27 (describing battles over DDT registra-
tion in the U.S.). 
86. Afshin Mo1avi, Africa'S Malaria Death Toll Still 'Outrageously High', NAT'L GEO-
GRAPmc NEWS, June 12, 2003, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.comlnews/2003/06/ 
0612_030612_ma1aria.html. 
87. David Brown, WHO Urges Use oj DDT in Africa, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2006, at A9, 
available at http://www.wasmngtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlartic1e/2006/09115/ AR200609150 1 
012.html. 
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easy to forgive. Confronting such difficult choices is what we must do, if 
we are to come to terms with our responsibilities to the poor. 
* * * 
Economics is often called the dismal science. And its predictions can 
be dismal indeed for those who do not heed its counsel. But once we con-
front the world through the lens of economic thinking-as Terry Anderson 
of PERC said, through "Coase-colored glasses"88-the dismal label seems 
inappropriate. Instead let us rejoice that God designed the world such that 
we do not depend on the goodness of our fellow men for our daily bread. 
Given the fallen nature of the world, I think it no accident that it is not, as 
Adam Smith famously observed "from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advan-
tages."89 If He had left us dependent on the good will of our neighbors for 
our suppers, humanity's history would have been marked by a great deal of 
hunger. God did not put us into an abundant world to starve. 
In addressing the needs of the poor and the demands of stewardship, 
good intentions are not enough; we must do what actually works. Markets 
work. The alternatives do not. That markets are a second best alternative 
necessitated by the fallen nature of our world is irrelevant if second best is 
all we can attain. We have lived in the epoch of legislation based on good 
intentions since the progressive era. Perhaps it is time we return to a world 
in which we recognize the limits of human-designed institutions such as 
governments and address our serious problems through institutions that util-
ize the insights of economic analysis and harness our innate self-interest in 
order to improve the lives of the poor while protecting that with which we 
have been entrusted. If we do so, I believe we will find that our obligations 
to be good stewards of God's creation and to care for our less fortunate 
brethren are more readily and effectively addressed. 
88. See generally Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Coloured Glasses: A Property Rights 
View of Natural Resource Economics, 48 AUSTRL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 445 (2004). 
89. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS I 
26-27 (Liberty Fund 1981) (1776). 
